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Chapter 1 
Introduction: European Union climate leadership 
Rüdiger K.W. Wurzel1, Duncan Liefferink and James Connelly 
 
Introduction 
There is no shortage of would-be leaders in EU climate change politics. The EU institutions 
(e.g. European Council, Council of the EU, Commission and the European Parliament (EP)), 
member states and societal actors have all, though to varying degrees and at different time 
periods, tried to offer leadership in EU and international climate change politics. Importantly, 
public support for EU environmental policy in general, and climate change policy in 
particular, has been consistently high (e.g. Eurobarometer 2015). The economic recession 
which followed the 2008 financial crises triggered only a moderate drop in public support for 
EU action on climate change, although considerable variation exists between member states. 
 
The EU has widely been portrayed as a leader in international climate change politics 
(e.g. Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013; Grubb and Gupta 2000; Jordan et al. 2010; Oberthür 
and Roche Kelly 2008; Wurzel and Connelly 2011a). However, despite a burgeoning 
literature on EU climate change leadership it is still not well understood why, how and when 
the EU, its member states, and societal actors can offer what type of leadership in EU and 
international climate change politics.  
 
Core themes and overall analytical framework  
This book adopts an actor-centred approach to the analysis of EU climate change politics. Its 
chapters all address, from the perspective of the main actor(s) on which they focus, the 
following four key themes: (1) leadership, (2) multi-level and polycentric governance, (3) 
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policy instruments, and (4) green and low carbon economy. Of these, leadership is the over-
arching theme.  
 
Leadership 
Despite the surge in scholarly interest in the EU’s leadership role in international climate 
change politics, leadership remains a contested concept which is used in differing ways in 
different studies (cf. Nye 2008; Young 1991). Our Introduction explains the leadership 
concept as applied by the authors of the chapters in this book.   
 
Many studies of environmental politics have identified different types of leadership, 
although their respective classifications vary between different studies. Drawing primarily on 
Young (1991), Underdal (1994), Grubb and Gupta (2000), Wurzel and Connelly (2011a) and 
Liefferink and Wurzel (2016), we distinguish four main types of leadership - structural, 
entrepreneurial, cognitive and exemplary - and two styles of leadership, namely 
humdrum/transactional and heroic/transformative.2  
 
Structural leadership relates to an actor’s hard power, which depends on material 
resources (e.g. military and economic resources). As the relevance of military power tends to 
be low for solving environmental problems – not even the world’s most powerful country 
could prevent climate change by military action – structural leadership rests primarily on 
economic power. It is the Single European Market (SEM) – the world’s largest internal 
market – which gives the EU the economic power resources required for structural 
leadership. The EU may allow, for example, the import of certain products into its SEM only 
if they comply with minimum environmental standards. Similarly, member states (especially 
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large ones) and societal actors (e.g. businesses and environmental NGOs - ENGOs) can 
provide structural leadership (Wurzel and Connelly 2011b).  
 
Secondly, entrepreneurial leadership involves diplomatic, negotiating and bargaining 
efforts which are necessary for finding compromise solutions in climate change negotiations. 
Entrepreneurial leadership enables the adoption of package deals which offer benefits to all 
parties involved. Successful French diplomatic efforts in the run-up to and during the 2015 
Paris climate conference (COP 21) provide good examples (see Chapter 7). In international 
climate change politics it has traditionally been the Commission (see Chapter 3) and the 
rotating six-monthly EU Council Presidency (see Chapter 5) which have offered 
entrepreneurial leadership. However, especially large member states – France, Germany and 
the UK - have recently taken on the role of ‘lead negotiators’ which stay in place well beyond 
the rotating EU Presidency whose influence has declined in international climate change 
negotiations (Interviews 2013-15; see Chapters 2 and 5). The European External Action 
Service (EEAS), which was created in 2011, has potentially provided the EU with additional 
entrepreneurial leadership capacity in the form of a diplomatic service which can be activated 
on international climate change issues although in practice it is underutilised. 
 
Thirdly, cognitive leadership involves the definition and/or redefinition of interests, 
problem perceptions and conceivable solutions through concepts such as the ‘green’ or low 
carbon economy, or ecological modernisation, which propounds the view that ambitious 
environmental measures are beneficial for both the environment and economy (Jänicke 
1993). Cognitive environmental leadership often relies on scientific expertise and practical 
implementation knowledge (Liefferink and Wurzel 2016). The EU has been portrayed as a 
‘normative power’ (Manners, 2002), which suggests that it relies more heavily on cognitive 
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than on structural leadership. The Commission and other actors have tried to reconceptualise 
climate change from being a purely environmental issue, to one entailing both a security 
dimension (e.g. energy security) and an economic dimension (e.g. ‘green’ jobs in the low 
carbon economy) (cf. Wurzel and Connelly 2011b: 277-8). 
 
Lacking significant military powers and only infrequently mobilising its structural 
‘market power’ (Damro 2012) when exerting climate leadership, the EU has specialized in 
providing entrepreneurial and particularly cognitive leadership. Small member states which 
are keen on ambitious EU and/or international climate change policy measures but have few 
power resources often use similar strategies. For example, Denmark and the Netherlands have 
gained disproportionate influence (by comparison with their population sizes) on EU 
environmental policy (e.g. Liefferink and Andersen 1998).   
 
Fourthly, our book will also focus on exemplary leadership or leadership by example 
(Liefferink and Wurzel 2016). Exemplary leadership is similar but not identical to directional 
leadership as defined by Grubb and Gupta (2000). While directional leadership assumes an 
intention to set a good example for others - actors which use directional leadership want to 
attract followers - our definition of exemplary leadership includes both (1) intentional 
example setting with the aim of attracting followers (i.e. directional leadership) and (2) 
unintentional example setting. In the latter case, actors adopt ambitious climate change 
measures primarily for internal reasons without wanting to influence others. However, 
unintentional example setting may nevertheless be emulated by others. Denmark is often held 
up as a member state which is primarily interested in adopting ambitious domestic 
environmental policy measures rather than in attracting followers (Andersen and Liefferink 
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1997; see also Chapter 6). The policy diffusion and transfer literature offers many instances 
of intentional and unintentional transnational example setting (e.g. Tews et al. 2003). 
 
In this book we also draw on different leadership styles which has two major 
analytical advantages (Wurzel and Connelly 2011b; Liefferink and Wurzel 2016). First, it 
allows for the analysis of how leaders and pioneers act. Second, it enables us to introduce a 
time dimension (e.g. short or long term) for assessing the actions of leaders and pioneers. For 
our analytical leadership styles dimension we draw on Hayward (1975, 2008), who 
differentiated humdrum from heroic leadership, and Burns (1978, 2003) who distinguished 
between transactional and transformational leadership (see Liefferink and Wurzel 2016). 
Following Lindblom’s (1959) concept of ‘muddling through’, Hayward (1975, 2008: 6) 
defined a humdrum leadership style as one where there is no ‘explicit, overriding, long-term 
objective and action is incremental, departing only slightly from existing policies as 
circumstances require’. In contrast, a heroic style, which normally can be used only 
occasionally, ‘sets explicit long-term objectives to be pursued by maximum coordination of 
public policies and by an ambitious assertion of political will’ (Hayward 2008: 7).  
 
For Burns (2003: 375), transactional leadership amounts to reactive leadership which 
adjusts to external circumstances and aims at achieving ‘short-term expedient goals rather 
than long-term political strategy’ (Burns 2003: 5). In contrast, transformational leadership 
aims to bring about profound or even ‘revolutionary’ change, which usually requires the 
pursuit of long term objectives. Importantly, although transactional leadership usually fosters 
only incremental piecemeal changes, ‘[c]ontinual transaction over a long period of time can 
produce transformation’ (Burns 2003: 25). Transactional and transformational styles should 
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therefore be perceived as part of a continuum; the same applies to humdrum and heroic 
leadership (Wurzel and Connelly 2011b; Liefferink and Wurzel 2016). 
 
Although subtle differences exist between humdrum and transactional leadership 
styles, and between heroic and transformational leadership styles (Liefferink and Wurzel, 
2016), for the purposes of the argument of this book they are sufficiently close to permit the 
merging of humdrum with transactional, and heroic with transformational leadership styles.   
 
Table 1.1 presents summary definitions of the leadership types and styles as used in 
the chapters which follow. 
 
Table 1.1: Types and Styles of Leadership  
Types of leadership  Styles of leadership  
1) Structural leadership: 
 Relies on material resources 
(e.g. economic or military strength) 
derived from hard power. 
 
2) Entrepreneurial leadership: 
 Diplomatic, negotiating and 
bargaining skills.  
 
3) Cognitive leadership: 
a) Humdrum/transactional leadership: 
 Humdrum leadership is short-
term and incremental, leading to 
marginal adjustments of existing 
policies. Transactional leadership is 
reactive and aims at short-term 
expedient goals without the provision 
of long-term strategies. 
 
b) Heroic/transformational leadership: 
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 Definition/redefinition of 
interests through ideas (e.g. low 
carbon economy). 
 
4) Exemplary leadership: 
 Intentional and unintentional 
example-setting.  
 Heroic leadership relies on 
long-term objectives, strong policy 
coordination and the assertion of 
political will. Transformational 
leadership aims to bring about radical 
or ‘revolutionary’ change. 
 
Sources: Adapted from Young (1991), Burns (1978, 2003), Hayward (1975, 2008), Nye 
(2008), Wurzel and Connelly (2011a/b) and Liefferink and Wurzel (2016).  
 
Actors’ internal ambitions (to adopt progressive domestic climate change measures) 
have to be distinguished from their external ambitions (to lead others on climate change 
policy). Importantly, ambitions may change over time (e.g. the UK developed from an 
environmental laggard to a climate change leader) and vary between policy areas (e.g. 
Germany has high ambitions for renewable energy and low ambitions for phasing out coal 
(see Chapters 8 and 12 respectively). 
 
Actors with high internal and low external ambitions are pioneers which unilaterally 
adopt more progressive internal climate change policy measures without regard for other 
actors. Pioneers set a good example without intending to attract followers. However, others 
may nevertheless follow their example. Leaders with high internal and high external 
ambitions are pushers which actively seek to attract followers. Symbolic leaders are 
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characterized by low internal and high external ambitions. Laggards have neither internal nor 
external ambitions (Liefferink and Wurzel 2016).  
 
The early literature on leaders and pioneers in environmental/climate change politics 
focused almost exclusively on states (e.g. Andersen and Liefferink 1997; Underdal 1994; 
Young 1991). However, this has changed with non-state actors, such as the EU, ENGOs, 
businesses and cities, having also been identified as potential environmental/climate policy 
leaders and pioneers. The reasons why non-state actors have increasingly been seen as 
offering climate change leadership are complex and contested. The list of possible reasons 
includes the 2008 global financial crises and resultant global recession which pushed 
environmental/climate policy actors onto the defensive, the political salience of climate 
change becoming somewhat less important relative to other political issues (e.g. economic or 
migration issues), and state actor-dominated top-down government allegedly giving way to 
non-hierarchical forms of governance in which non-state actors play a central role. Although 
the reasons are contested, there is widespread agreement in the academic literature and 
amongst practitioners (Interviews 2013-15) that some of the EU’s traditional environmental 
leaders (e.g. the Netherlands, see Chapter 9) have become more cost-conscious and less 
willing to provide climate change leadership.    
 
Multi-level and polycentric climate governance 
Arguably, to a greater extent than most policy areas, climate change policy permeates all 
levels of governance and requires the involvement of a wide variety of actors ranging from 
international organisations to individual citizens. This is one important reason why this book 
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pays attention not only to the EU institutions, and (member) states but also to businesses and 
ENGOs. Multi-level governance (MLG) and polycentric governance therefore constitute 
important research themes in this book. 
 
According to Stephenson (2013: 817) MLG ‘has been used to try to provide a 
simplified notion of what is pluralistic and highly dispersed policy-making activity, where 
multiple actors (individuals and institutions) participate, at various political levels, from the 
supranational to the sub-national or local level’, while Algica and Tarko (2012: 237) have 
defined polycentricity as ‘a social system of many decision centres having limited and 
autonomous prerogative and operating under an overarching set of rules’. MLG and 
polycentricity share certain core presuppositions, although conceptually they are not 
identical. Importantly, by comparison with polycentricity, MLG studies usually assume a 
stronger involvement of governmental actors in both the setting and implementation of the 
rules of the game. However, compared with state-centred approaches, MLG places more 
emphasis on sub-national governmental and non-state actors. Polycentricity, on the other 
hand, attributes a stronger degree of autonomy to subnational local actors and non-
governmental actors, including individuals. Most MLG-inspired EU studies emphasise the 
mutual dependency of EU and governmental actors (including national and subnational 
governmental actors) as well as (although to a somewhat lesser degree) non-governmental 
actors. Polycentric studies are primarily interested in the discovery of cases of societal self-
coordination at various levels of governance as well as the mechanisms and rules of the game 
which underpin successful self-coordination in the face of collective action problems. It is 
possible to argue that polycentricity is closer to the operation of markets (see Chapter 14) 
than networks in which governmental actors (including EU institutional actors) play an 
important, if not dominant, role as most MLG studies promulgate.    
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The concept of MLG has long been widely used in the assessment of the EU, 
especially its structural policy (e.g. Hooghe 1996; Marks 1993) and (though to a lesser 
degree) its environmental policy (e.g. Fairbrass and Jordan 2004). The concept of 
polycentricity has rarely been used to study EU climate change policy, although there are 
exceptions (Jordan and Huitema 2014; Rayner and Jordan 2013; Jänicke 2015). This is 
despite the plea by Elinor Ostrom (2012: 82), one of the pioneers of the concept of 
polycentricity: ‘Indeed, I argue very strongly for the need for polycentric institutions to cope 
with climate change’.   
 
Broadly speaking, the EU has consistently demanded an MLG-type global climate 
governance system which relies on the UN as the negotiating forum for the adoption of 
legally binding GHGE reduction targets and deadlines. However, other important actors in 
international climate change politics (e.g. US, China and India, see Chapters 16, 17 and 18) 
instead favoured voluntary pledges or so-called Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs) (see below).  
 
Partly because the EU constitutes an unconventional MLG system rather than a 
conventional state, it has sometimes struggled both to act as a coherent collective political 
entity in the international climate change negotiations and, in cases where it did so, to be 
recognised by third states as such an actor. The EU’s capacity to act in the international arena 
has occasionally been contested by both EU internal actors (e.g. member governments) and 
actors outside the EU (e.g. developing countries). In other words the EU’s ‘actorness’ has 
been questioned: which is one important reason why most international climate change 
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agreements are so-called mixed agreements that are signed by the EU and its member states 
(see Chapter 2).  
 
Some of the EU’s core characteristics as an MLG system help to explain its 
occasional inability to adopt progressive internal and/or external climate change goals and 
thus to provide successful climate change leadership. At first sight the EU seems ill equipped 
to offer climate change leadership because decision-making powers are dispersed amongst a 
wide range of actors. The EU was founded shortly after the Second World War with the aim 
of ‘“taming” the “beast” ... of leadership’ (Blondel 1987: 3). It is therefore not surprising that 
the EU has been characterised as a ‘leaderless Europe’ (Hayward 2008). The existence of 
many veto actors has repeatedly created political deadlock and ‘joint decision traps’ (Scharpf 
1988) from which the EU had difficulties to escape.  
 
 Against this background, it is remarkable how often the EU’s climate change policy 
has in fact managed to overcome decisional stalemate.  This shows that the EU’s MLG 
structures do not necessarily preclude it from adopting progressive internal climate policy 
measures and from acting as a leader in international climate change politics (Schreurs amd 
Tiberghien 2007). Because MLG extends beyond the boundaries of the EU, this book also 
offers an external perspective provided by chapters on the US (Chapter 16), China (Chapter 
17) and India (Chapter 18). 
 
Policy instruments 
Environmental policy instruments can be grouped into the following three main categories: 
(1) regulations (or ‘command-and-control’ instruments); (2) market-based instruments (e.g. 
eco-taxes and emissions trading schemes); and, (3) voluntary agreements and informational 
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devices (e.g. Wurzel, Zito and Jordan 2013). Regulations set legally binding targets and 
deadlines which governmental actors enforce. Market-based instruments provide fiscal 
incentives for actors which can choose the most-efficient compliance option. Voluntary 
agreements rely on companies or states’ willingness to honour pledges while informational 
instruments appeal to the ‘green’ conscience of consumers. 
 
Majone (1996) has characterised the EU as a ‘regulatory state’ because it relies 
heavily on traditional regulation. Until the late 1990s, this has been true also for the EU’s 
climate change policy (e.g. Wurzel, Zito and Jordan 2013). There are three main reasons for 
this. First, environmental policy was initially perceived as an inherently regulatory policy. 
Second, the EU can make use only of a limited number of redistributive policy instruments 
(e.g. structural funds). Third, the EU Treaties allow member states to veto eco-taxes.  
 
Thus, attempts to adopt market-based instruments failed because the Commission’s 
1992 proposal for a common CO2/energy was vetoed by the UK on sovereignty grounds (see 
Chapter 12). Unable to overcome this stalemate, the Commission published its proposal for a 
Directive establishing an EU emissions trading scheme (ETS) in 2001 (CEC 2001). The EP 
and the Environmental Council adopted the Commission’s EU ETS proposal speedily and 
with relatively few changes (see Chapter 3). When the EU ETS became operational in 2005 it 
was the world’s first supranational ETS. This is remarkable as it was the US which had first 
innovated with regional emissions trading schemes (for sulphur dioxide and nitrous oxides) in 
the 1980s, while the EU initially opposed American efforts to include emissions trading as a 
possible policy instrument in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (Skjærseth and Wettestad 2008; 
Wurzel 2008). Voluntary agreements and informational policy tools have often been 
promoted by businesses (see Chapter 14) while ENGOs have remained highly sceptical about 
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self-regulatory tools (see Chapter 15). Such instruments play only a secondary role in EU 
climate change policy.  
 
Green economy and low carbon economy 
One of the clearest statements in favour of a ‘green’ or low carbon economy by an EU 
institutional actor can be found in the Commission’s Roadmap for Moving to a Competitive 
Low Carbon Economy in 2050 (CEC 2011). The document argues that ambitious EU climate 
change policy measures will trigger ‘smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ (CEC 2011: 3) 
and states that  
[i]nvesting early in the low carbon economy would stimulate a gradual structural 
change in the economy and can create in net terms new jobs both in the short- and the 
medium-term... In the longer-term, the creation and preservation of jobs will depend 
on the EU's ability to lead in terms of the development of new low carbon 
technologies through increased education, training, programmes to foster acceptability 
of new technologies, R&D and entrepreneurship, as well as favourable economic 
framework conditions for investments (CEC 2011:12). 
 
 
Although the 2050 Roadmap does not explicitly mention ecological modernisation, it 
is clearly compatible with the concept which has received widespread support particularly in 
the Northern Europe (Jänicke 1993; CEC 2008; Wurzel and Connelly 2011b). The claim is 
that ecological modernisation can create a ‘double dividend’ or ‘win-win’ situation in which 
economic growth and the protection of the environment take place simultaneously (Jänicke 
1993). From a low carbon economy perspective, climate change therefore not only poses a 
threat but also creates opportunities for ‘green’ jobs. Moreover, a speedy uptake of renewable 
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energy would decrease EU member states’ dependence on energy imports (e.g. from Russia) 
and increase the EU’s energy security. However, the 2008 financial crises and the subsequent 
economic recession have diminished somewhat the support for a ‘green’ or low carbon 
economy while proponents of ecological modernisation have been put on the defensive.  
 
A short history of EU climate change politics 
As a brief introduction to the chapters which follow, this section provides a thumb nail guide 
to core events and actions in EU internal and external climate change politics.   
 
The following five phases of EU climate change policy can broadly be identified: (1) late 
1980s to 1992: formation and formulation phase; (2) 1992-2001: Kyoto Protocol negotiation 
phase; (3) 2001-2005: Kyoto Protocol rescue phase; (4) 2005-2015: Kyoto Protocol 
implementation and negotiation of a follow up agreement phase; and, (5) since 2015: 2015 
Paris Agreement ratification and implementation phase.  
 
Various EU institutional actors (Chapters 2-5), member states (Chapters 6-12) and societal 
actors (Chapters 13-14) as well as non-EU countries (Chapters 13 and 16-18) reacted 
somewhat differently to the challenges of climate change and the changing opportunity 
structures of EU and/or global climate change politics. As will become clear in the following 
chapters, from the perspective of different EU institutional, member state, societal and non-
EU actors the phases can appear differently.  
 
Table 1.2: Main phases of EU climate change politics 
Late 1980s-1992: formation and formulation phase  
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 1986: EP climate change policy resolution 
 1988: Commission communication  
 1990: European Council for early adoption of targets. Joint Environmental and Energy 
 Council agreed CO2 stabilisation of by 2000 (at 1990 levels)  
 1991: Commission’s proposal for EU climate change policy   
1992-2001: Kyoto protocol negotiation phase  
 1992: UN Rio conference adopted UNFCCC: EU accepted CO2 stabilisation by 2000 
(compared to 1990) 
 1997: Kyoto Protocol negotiations: EU proposed 15% reduction of three GHGs by 2010 
 (compared to 1990) but settled for 8% reduction of six GHGs by 2008-12 (compared 
 to 1990/1995) 
 1998: Burden sharing agreement 
 2000: First ECCP 
2001-2005: Kyoto Protocol rescue phase  
 2001: US dropped out of the Kyoto Protocol. EU Environmental Council and European 
Council for Kyoto Protocol ratification 
 2002: EP voted (540 to 4 votes) in favour of Kyoto Protocol ratification. Kyoto Protocol 
ratified by EU  
 2003: Commission’s EU ETS proposal 
2005-2015: Kyoto Protocol implementation and negotiations of a follow-up agreement  
 2005:  Kyoto Protocol entered into force. EU ETS became operational.  
 2007: European Council agreed ‘20-20 by 2020’ climate and energy package:  
- Unilateral 20% GHGE reductions by 2020 (compared to 1990) 
- Binding 20% renewable energy by 2020 
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- Non-binding 20% energy efficiency improvement by 2020  
- Conditional 30% GHGE reductions by 2020 if ‘comparable efforts’ by other 
developed and ‘adequate efforts’ by leading developing countries 
 2008: EU adopted legally binding CO2 limits for cars, revision of EU ETS and effort 
 sharing decision 
 2009: EU agreed €7.2 billion fast track money for climate change adaptation in 
 developing countries. Copenhagen climate conference (COP15) adopted 
 Copenhagen Accord 
 2014: European Council adopted ‘2030 climate and energy package’: 
- at least 40% reduction of GHGE by 2030 (compared to 1990)  
- at least 27% increase of renewables by 2030 
- indicative energy saving target of 27% by 2030 
Since 2015: Paris Agreement ratification and implementation phase 
 2015: Paris Agreement: 
o Limit global temperature rise to 2.0/1.5°C  
o Peak of global emissions as soon as possible  
o Voluntary national reduction pledges (NDCs) 
 2016: Ratification process of the 2015 Paris Agreement 
 
 
Late 1980s-1992: Formation and formulation phase 
In 1986 the EP became the first EU institution to request a common climate change policy 
(see Table 1.2 and Chapter 4). Two years later the Commission issued a communication on 
climate change. In 1990, the European Council adopted a resolution which demanded the 
early adoption of GHGE reduction targets on the UN level. In the same year a joint 
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Environment and Energy Council adopted a political agreement on the stabilisation of the 
EU’s CO2 emissions by 2000 (compared to 1990) which, however, was conditional on other 
highly developed countries taking similar steps. According to Haigh (1996: 162) it enabled 
the EU ‘to take a strong and leading role, particularly in relation to the United States’. While 
the US had acted as a leader on the Montreal Protocol on ozone layer depleting substances, in 
climate change politics it was the EU which started to take over the leadership role from the 
US (see Chapters 2 and 17). 
 
 The EU signed the UN framework convention on climate change (UNFCCC) at the 
1992 UN Rio ‘Earth summit’. Because it had not yet adopted adequate common policy 
measures to implement its commitments under the UNFCCC, the EU created a ‘capability-
expectation gap’ (Hill 1993) which it was able to close only with the adoption of legally 
binding climate policy measures within the framework of the 2000 and 2005 European 
Climate Change Programmes (ECCPs).  
 
In early 1992, at a time of high public environmental awareness and relatively strong 
support for deeper European integration, the Commission proposed an EU-wide carbon 
dioxide (CO2)/energy tax which was, however, vetoed by the UK on sovereignty grounds 
(see Chapter 12). The Council adopted the Commission’s proposals for a Framework 
Directive on energy efficiency measures by member states (SAVE), a Decision on renewable 
energy (ALTENER) and a Decision to monitor CO2 emissions, but these were insufficient 
measures for reaching the EU’s proposed CO2 emissions stabilisation target.  
 
1992-2001: Kyoto protocol negotiation phase 
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During the 1992 UNFCCC negotiations the EU acted largely as a symbolic leader because it 
did not yet have in place significant reduction measures to back up its ambitious rhetoric. In 
the negotiations leading to the Kyoto Protocol the EU initially offered a 15 per cent reduction 
in GHGE by 2010 (compared to 1990 levels) on condition that its main economic competitors 
(at the time the US and Japan) would accept similar reductions. Because the US accepted 
only a seven per cent reduction target, the EU settled for an eight per cent reduction target in 
GHGE by 2008-12. Against initial opposition from the EU the US insisted on the inclusion of 
the following flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol: (1) emissions trading, (2) joint 
implementation (JI), which allowed developed countries jointly to implement GHGE 
reduction projects with developing countries, and (3) the clean development mechanism 
(CDM) which permitted developed countries to sponsor GHGE reduction projects in 
developing countries for which the former could earn saleable certified emission reduction 
(CER) credits.  
 
In 1998, the EU adopted the ‘burden sharing’ agreement which set member states 
differentiated reduction targets for achieving the EU’s collective 8 per cent CO2 emissions 
target. Germany and the UK, which are the EU’s largest GHGE emitters, accepted CO2 
reductions rates of 21 and 12.5 per cent respectively. Germany benefited from ‘wall fall 
profits’ (due to the deindustrialisation of the former East Germany following the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989), and the UK was helped by its 1980s ‘dash for gas’3 which has a lower 
carbon content than coal (see Chapters 8 and 12).  
 In October 2000, the Environmental Council accepted most of the Commission’s 
communication Towards a European Climate Change Programme (CEC 2000) thus paving 
the way for the adoption of the first ECCP in 2000.  
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Kyoto Protocol rescue phase: 2001-2005 
On 13 March 2001, President George W. Bush announced that the US would not ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol which had been signed by his predecessor Bill Clinton (see Chapter 16). 
Because, at the time, the US was the largest emitter of GHGE the Kyoto Protocol seemed 
doomed. However, a few weeks later, the Environmental Council agreed that the EU should 
pursue the Kyoto Protocol ratification process. After approval by the European Council and 
overwhelming support from the EP the EU ratified the Kyoto Protocol in May 2002 (see 
Chapters 4 and 5). After much lobbying from the EU, both Japan and Russia eventually 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol (thus reaching the required 55 per cent of the total 1990 CO2 
emissions from industrialised countries) which entered into force in 2005.  
 
 Frustrated by the veto to its CO2/energy tax proposal and encouraged by the early 
experience with emissions trading in the US, the Commission’s Directorate General for 
Environment (DG Environment) commissioned studies on emissions trading in the late 1990s 
(see Chapter 3). Following meetings with member governments and stakeholders, the 
Commission published its proposal for an EU ETS Directive in 2001 (CEC 2001). The EP 
and the Environmental Council speedily adopted a modified version of the Commission’s EU 
ETS proposal in 2003 (Skjaerseth and Wettestad 2008). The EU had thus somewhat belatedly 
been transmogrified from an emissions trading laggard to a leader which set up the world’s 
first supranational ETS (Skjærseth and Wettestad 2008; Wurzel 2008; see also Chapter 3).  
   
2005-2015: Kyoto Protocol implementation and follow-up agreement negotiation phase 
The EU ETS, which became operational in 2005, has become the EU’s main climate change 
policy instrument (Skjærseth and Wettestad 2008) although, within the framework of the 
second EPCC, the EU also adopted Directives on energy efficiency and the promotion of 
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renewable energy and concluded a voluntary agreement with the European, Japanese and 
Korean automobile manufacturers on the reduction of CO2 which, however, was later 
overtaken by legislation as the voluntary agreement had failed.  
 
 In March 2007 the European Council meeting affirmed the EU’s climate leadership 
when it adopted the ‘20-20-20’ climate and energy package which included a binding 
unilateral 20 per cent CO2 reduction target by 2020 (compared to 1990 levels), a legally 
binding 20 per cent renewable energy target by 2020 and a non-binding 20 per cent energy 
efficiency improvement by 2020. The EU also adopted a 30 per cent CO2 emissions reduction 
target by 2020 which was, however, made conditional on ‘comparable efforts’ by other 
developed and ‘adequate efforts’ by leading developing countries. After arduous negotiations 
the EU adopted the effort sharing decision (which replaced the burden sharing agreement) 
and agreed on a review of the flagging EU ETS at the European Council in December 2008. 
In order to strengthen its international climate leader position the EU offered 7.22 billion 
Euros in ‘fast track’ funding for climate adaptation measures in developing countries and 
tried to form alliances on the international level (see Chapter 2). 
  
However, although the EU had adopted relatively ambitious internal climate change 
policy measures and pledged significant climate funds for developing countries, it was not 
able to significantly influence the ‘Copenhagen Accord’ adopted at the 2009 Copenhagen 
climate conference (COP15). The Copenhagen Accord, widely seen as a weak and vague 
agreement, was largely negotiated by the US and Brazil, South Africa, India and China 
(BASIC countries) without direct EU involvement at the crucial negotiating phase (see 
Chapters 2 and 5). There are complex reasons why the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference 
arguably constituted a low point (if not the lowest point) for EU international climate 
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leadership (see Chapters 2, 5, 6 and 17). However, to a large degree the EU recovered its 
status as a leader in international climate change politics at the 2010 Cancún (COP16), 2011 
Durban (COP17) and 2014 Lima (COP20) climate conferences which eventually paved the 
way for a Kyoto Protocol follow-up agreement in the form of the 2015 Paris Agreement.  
 
In October 2014 the European Council adopted the 2030 climate and energy package 
which stipulated a legally binding GHGE reduction target of at least 40% by 2030 (compared 
to 1990), a legally binding target to increase the share of renewables to 27% by 2030 
(although without binding national targets) and an indicative energy saving target of 27% by 
2030 (see Chapter 5). However, unlike in the run up to the 2009 Copenhagen climate 
conference (COP15), the EU did not adopt an effort sharing decision prior to the 2015 Paris 
Agreement.  
 
Since 2015: Paris Agreement ratification and implementation phase 
In the climate change agreement, adopted in Paris in December 2015, 195 countries 
committed themselves to achieving as soon as possible a peak of global GHGE while trying 
to limit the global temperature rise to well below 2 °C and to undertake efforts to limit the 
temperature rise to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. The inclusion of the relatively 
ambitious 1.5 °C goal in the Paris Agreement came as a surprise to EU policy makers and 
even ENGOs (Interviews, 2015-16). The Paris Agreement will enter into force once it has 
been ratified by at least 55 countries accounting for at least 55 per cent of global GHGE. 
 
In the run up to the 2015 Paris climate conference (COP21) countries had to submit 
national voluntary pledges (INDCs). The 2015 Paris Agreement made the INDCs legally 
binding, while turning them into Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) which, 
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however, are likely to limit the global temperature rise merely to about 3° C, unless they can 
be made more ambitions during the Paris Agreement implementation phase (Interview, EU 
official, 2016). A five-yearly review process, permitting only the ratcheting upwards of 
NDCs is meant to ensure that the 1.5° C goal will be achieved. Moreover, a $100 billion 
global climate fund was set up to assist developing countries in adapting to climate change.  
 
The 2015 Paris Agreement constitutes a departure from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol 
because it adopted a bottom up approach which allowed countries to put forward voluntary 
national reduction pledges. The EU had initially favoured the continuation of the Kyoto 
Protocol’s top-down approach of internationally agreed legally binding reduction targets and 
deadlines. It finally accepted the new approach when it became apparent that several key 
countries (including the US, China and India) were only prepared to accept a bottom up 
approach. However, the EU succeeded with its demand that the national voluntary pledges 
should be enshrined in a legally binding UN climate change treaty which stipulates a five-
yearly review and transparency measures (Interview, EU official, 2016; Oberthür 2016). 
 
The EU played a significant role in the negotiations by brokering a ‘high-ambition 
coalition’ which eventually was made up by more than 100 developed and developing 
countries (including the US but not China and India). As mentioned above, in its 2030 
climate and energy package, the EU had already ‘pledged’ a legally binding unilateral 40% 
GHGE reduction target for 2030 (compared to 1990 levels) (see Chapters 2, 3-5 and 7). The 
EU’s approach has been referred to as ‘leadiating’ (Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013; see also 
Chapter 5) because it consisted of both acting as leader and mediator. Such an approach 
helped the EU to regain much of its international climate politics leader status which it had 
lost at the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference (COP15). However, ENGOs have argued 
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that the 2015 Paris Agreement’s 1.5° C goal would necessitate a significant ratcheting up of 
the EU’s 40 per cent GHGE emission reduction target for 2030 (see Chapter 15).  
 
Structure of the book 
The next chapter (with this Introduction constituting Part I) focuses on the EU’s ability to act 
as a global player in international climate change politics. Part II assesses why, when, and 
how supranational institutional actors pushed the EU to adopt a leadership position in 
international climate change politics. The next two parts analyse why, when, and how 
member states (Part III) and important societal actors (Part IV) have offered domestic 
leadership and/or supported EU and international climate change leadership. Finally Part V 
offers an external perspective by focusing on the US, China and India.  
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